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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Testamentary Option To Purchase Realty Can Be 
Exercised Under Anti-Lapse Statute by 
Heirs of Benefi.ciary-
Tuecke v. Tuecke* 
Testator devised his farm to his son and two daughters. The son, 
who predeceased his father, was bequeathed an option to purchase 
the daughters' two-thirds interest in the farm for a specified amount. 
Over the objection of the daughters, the heirs of the son sought to 
exercise the option under an anti-lapse statute.1 The trial court con-
cluded that the son's heirs had inherited the right to purchase. On 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Iowa, held~ affirmed. An option to 
purchase is a valuable property right inheritable under an anti-lapse 
statute. 
The common-law rule that a bequest lapses when the beneficiary 
predeceases the testator2 is altered by anti-lapse statutes, which create 
a presumption that the testator would have preferred that the be-
quest be distributed to the heirs of the beneficiary.8 The presump-
tion, however, does not seek to overcome indications that the testator 
• 131 N.W .2d 794 (Iowa 1964) (hereinafter cited as principal case). 
I. "If a devisee die before the testator, his heirs shall inherit the property, unless 
from the terms of the will, the intent is clear and explicit to the contrary." IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 633.273 (1964). 
2. See generally 6 PAGE, WILLS §§ 50.10-.13 (Bowe-Parker ed. 1962). 
3. See generally Bordwell, The Statute Law of Wills-Death of Devisee or Legatee 
Before Testator, 14 IowA L R.Ev. 428 (1929); Mechem, Some Problems Under Anti-
Lapse Statutes, 19 IOWA L. R.Ev. 1 (1933). 
All but four states-Hawaii, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Wyoming-have anti-
lapse statutes. See Ar.A. ConE tit. 61, § 16 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 13.05.190 (1962); 
ARIZ. STAT. ANN. § 14-133 (1956); .ARK. STAT. ANN. § 60-410 {Supp. 1965); CAL, PROB, 
CODE § 92; COLO. REV. STAT • .ANN. § 153•5-10 (1963); CONN, GEN. STAT, REV. § 45-176 
(1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2313 (1953); D.C. CODE ANN. § 19·110 (1961); FLA, 
STAT. § 731.20 (1963); GA. CODE ANN. § 113-812 (1959); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 14·323 
(1948); ILL. _R.Ev. STAT. ch, 3, § 49 (1963); IND. ANN. STAT, § 6-60l(g)(2) (1953); IOWA 
CODE .ANN. § 633.273 (1964); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-615 (1949); KY, REV. STAT. 
§§ 394.440, .410 (1962); ME. R.Ev. STAT. ANN, tit. 18, § 1008 (1964); Mn. ANN, CODE art. 
93, § 354 (1964); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 191, § 22 (Supp. 1964); MICH. CoMP. LAws 
§ 702.11 (1948); MINN. STAT. § 525.203 (1961); Miss. ConE ANN. § 660 (1956); Mo. REV. 
STAT. § 474-460 (1959); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 91-139 (1964); NEB, REV. STAT. 
§ 30-228.03 (1964); NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.200 (1963); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN, § 551.12 
(1955); N.J. REv. STAT. § 3A:3-13 (1951); N.Y. DECED. ES'r. LAW § 29; N.C, GEN. STAT. 
§ 31-42 (Supp. 1963); N.D. CENT. ConE § 56-04-20 (1960); Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 2107,52 
(Page 1954); OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 142 (1961); ORE. REV. STAT, § 114.240 (1963); PA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.14(8) (1950); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 33-6-19 (1956); S.C. Com~ 
ANN. § 19-237 (1962); S.D. CODE § 56.0232 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-306 (1955); 
TEX. PROB. CODE § 68 (1956); UTAH CODE ANN. § 74-1-35 (1953); VT. STAT, ANN, tit. 14, 
§ 558 (1958); VA. CODE ANN.§ 64-64 (1950); WASH. REv. CODE § 11.12.110 (1959); W. VA, 
CODE ANN. § 4054 (1961); WIS. STAT. § 238.13 (1963). 
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desired that the gift be valid o:p.ly if the beneficiary survived him.<l 
Nevertheless, in the principal case the court applied the statutory 
presumption without examining the survivorship characteristics of 
options. Such an examination would have made it substantially more 
difficult for the court to allow the heirs to exercise the option. 
One line of authority the court should have considered holds 
that testamentary options are personal as a matter of law, and are 
therefore incapable of exercise after the optionee's death.5 The court 
could have rejected this authority on one of two grounds. The hold-
ings are either inadequately supported6 or based on the mistaken 
idea that the optionee has no rights with respect to the property be-
fore exercising the option.7 A second line of authority bases the 
question of survivorship on testamentary intent.8 Because of the 
difficulty of interpreting intent, these decisions provide no certainty 
that an option will be held to survive. An examination of the 
testator's intent in the principal case would have forced the court to 
resolve the question of whether a testator normally intends to benefit 
his children's heirs at the expense of his own children. The amo_unt 
to be paid by the son's heirs in exercise of the option was less than 
two-thirds of the fair market value of the farm.9 The effect of the 
decision, therefore, is that the son's heirs acquire the farm, while 
the daughters receive less than a proportionate share· of its value. 
Even if it can be said that the testator intended to benefit his son's 
4. The statutes merely change the common-law rule that all bequests, regardless 
of the inheritability of the property, lapse upon the beneficiary's predeceasing the 
testator. 6 PACE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 50.10, at 77. They do not create a survivable 
interest where none was intended. Therefore, if a bequest is not intended to survive 
the beneficiary's death when the beneficiary outlives the testator (in which case the 
anti-lapse statutes do not apply), the statutory presumption should not cause the same 
bequest to survive when the beneficiary happens to predecease the testator. . 
5. See Valley Bank&: Trust Co. v. Williams, 46 Ariz. 20, 46 P.2d 645 (1935); Lud-
wick's Estate, 269 Pa. 365, 112 Atl. 543 (1921); Adams v. Adams, 95 W. Va. 187, 120 
S.E. 590 (1923); Mohn v. Mohn, 148 Iowa 288, 126 N.W. 1127 (1910) (dictum); Brown v. 
Brown, 53 N.M. 379, 208 P.2d 1081 (1949) (dictum). See also 1 JARMAN, WILLS 73 
(7th ed. 1930). , 
6. Some of the cases made no attempt to support, either by citation of authority 
or by policy arguments, the .statement that options are personal. See, e.g., Valley Bank 
&: Trust Co. v. Williams, supra note ·5; Brown v. Brown, supra note 5. Other cases 
have cited and relied upon a statement in 40 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAw AND PROCEDURE 1973 
(1912), which refers to election between the will and a statutory share, rather than 
to options. See, e.g., Ludwick's Estate, supra note 5; Adams v. Adams, supra note 5. 
7. See, e.g., Mohn v. Mohn, 148 Iowa 288, 126 N.W. 1127 (1910), citing Conn v. 
Tonner, 86 Iowa 577, 53 N.W. 320 (1892), which adopted this view. In fact, purchase 
options carry with them legally protected rights not to have the property destroyed 
or conveyed to a third party with notice ~uring the life of the option. See IA CORBIN, 
CONTRACTS § 272, at 579 (1963). 
8. See, e.g., Lucas v. Scott, 239 Fed. 450 (9th Cir. 1917); Sterri v. Stem, 410 Ill. 377, 
102 N.E.2d 104 (1951); Miller v. Farmer's Bank, 312 Ky. 321, 227 S.W.2d ~29 (1950); 
Parker v. Seeley, 56 N.J. Eq. 110, 38 Atl. 28 (Ch. 1897); Boshart v. Evans, 55 Pa. (5 
Wharton) 551 (1840); Skelton v. Younghouse, [1942] A.C. 571. See also 1 JARMAN, 
WILLS 68 (8th ed. 1951). 
9. Principal case at 795. 
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heirs at the expense of his own children, the court completely over-
looked a serious problem posed by the Rule Against Perpetuities. 
Options without any time limit are invalid under the Rule as 
contingent interests which might fail to vest within lives in being 
plus twenty-one years.1° Courts seek to remove will options from the 
operation of the Rule by construing them to be personal to the 
optionee, for if the option is personal it extends only to one life in 
being and thus cannot exceed the perpetuities period.11 However, 
the court in the principal case could not have used this means of 
avoiding the Rule because in holding that the unexercised option 
could be exercised by the heirs of the optionee, the court had already 
decided that the option was not personal. Thus, to allow the heirs of 
the son to exercise the option, it appears that the court must hold the 
option non-personal for the purpose of inheritability and yet per-
sonal to avoid the Rule.12 Because of the obvious inconsistency of 
such a position, it would seem that a proper application of the Rule 
in the principal case would have invalidated the heirs' exercise of 
the option. 
A tax problem not readily apparent in the principal case further 
illustrates the questionable value of options as testamentary devices. 
Generally, the basis of purchased realty from which taxable gain is 
measured is cost,18 but the tax basis of inherited realty is its fair 
market value at the date of the testator's death.14 Therefore, if the 
realty increases in value while held by the testator, it will be in-
10. See, e.g., Maddox v. Keeler, 296 Ky. 440, 177 S.W.2d 568 (1944); Eastman Marble 
Co. v. Vermont Marble Co., 236 Mass. 138, 128 N.E. 177 (1920); Barton v. Thaw, 246 
Pa. 348, 92 Atl. 312 (1914); Skeen v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 137 Va. 397, ll9 S.E. 89 
(1923); Woodall v. Bfllen, 76 W. Va. 193, 85 S.E. 170 (1915). Contra, Todd v. Citizens' 
Gas Co., 46 F.2d 855 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 852 (1931); Keogh v. Peck, 316 
Ill. 318, 147 N.E. 266 (1925); Hollander v. Central Metal &: Supply Co., 109 Md. 131, 
71 Atl. 442 (1908). 
For criticism of the view that the Rule applies to testamentary options, see SIMES 
&: SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS §° 1244, at 159 (2d ed. 1956); Berg, Long-Term Options 
and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 37 CALIF. L. REv. (2 pts.) 1, 235, 236-57 (1949); 
Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HAR.v. L. REv. 638, 660 (1938). 
11. E.g., Weitzmann v. Weitzmann, 87 Ind. App. 236, 161 N.E. 385 (1928); In re 
Hauser's Will, 50 N.Y.S.2d 709 (Surr. Ct. 1944); Mattern v. Herzog, 367 S.W.2d 312 
(Tex. 1963). 
12. An alternate approach might have been to construe the option as exercisable 
only within a reasonable time, such as the length of time required to probate the 
estate. See, e.g., Ashmore v. Newman, 350 Ill. 64, 183 N.E. 1 (1932); Abens v. Kennedy, 
314 Ill. 35, 145 N.E. 100 (1924). There is nothing in the principal case, however, to 
indicate that the testator intended to limit the beneficiary to a reasonable time. If 
the option is inherited by the heirs, there would seem to be no reason to limit them 
either. In addition, the reasonable-time construction is questionable in view of the 
generally asserted proposition that the Rule applies whenever a contingent interest 
might possibly fail to vest within the perpetuities period. See, e.g., Lilley's Estate, 272 
Pa. 143, 116 Atl. 392 (1922); SIMES &: SMITH, op. cit. supra note 10, § 1228. 
13. !NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1012 
14. !NT, REv, CODE OF 1954, § 1014, 
December 1965] Recent Developments 339 
herited with a stepped-up basis, thereby reducing the potential tax 
liability. However, courts have consistently denied an optionee the 
more favorable basis, holding that even though an option is inherited, 
the property subject to the option is purchased, and thus acquires 
a basis equal only to the amount paid in exercise of the option.15 In 
the principal case, the potential tax advantage of the stepped-up basis 
was lost, since the basis of the interest in the farm obtained by the 
son's heirs is the amount for which it was purchased under the 
option, rather than its fair market value.16 
Alternatives to the testamentary option which accomplish the 
same result and yet avoid its disadvantages are a devise of the prop-
erty on condition subsequent that money be paid, and a devise sub-
ject to a charge in favor of the persons to receive payment from the 
devisee. The choice to be made by the draftsman will depend on the 
effect the testator desires to accord the devisee's failure to make pay-
ment. If the testator wishes to give other heirs a right of entry to 
defeat the interest of the non-paying devisee, the draftsman should 
make payment a condition subsequent.17 If the testator wants the 
devisee to retain his interest even if he fails to make payment, a 
charging clause imposing a lien on the interest in favor of the person 
to whom the money is to be paid should be used.18 Either alternative 
would vest an immediate,19 traditionally inheritable interest20 that 
15. Kalbac v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1962); Valleskey v. Nelson, 271 
F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1959), affirming 168 F. Supp. 636, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 960 (1960) 
(E.D. Wis. 1958); Mack v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 62 (lid Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 
719 (1945). 
16. It has been forcefully argued that since the optionee surrenders not only the 
amount paid in exercise of the option but also the market value of the option, the 
cost (and thus the basis) of the property acquired by option should include both. 
If this argument were accepted, the stepped-up basis would not be lost. The cost 
basis under § 1012 of the Internal Revenue Code would be identical to the stepped-up 
basis under § 1014, for the market value of property subject to an option is 
theoretically equivalent to the amount paid in exercise of the option plus the market 
value of the option. The argument, however, was reluctantly rejected when first 
:raised in Mack v. Commissioner, supra note 15. The argument was :raised again in 
Kalbac v. Commissioner, supra note 15, but since it was presented for the first time 
on appeal, the circuit court did not consider the question. 
17. S1111ES &: S111ITH, op. cit. supra note 10, § 151. 
18. See Thompson v. Thompson, 175 S.W.2d 885 (Mo. 1943); Friesz v. Friesz, 344 
Mo. 698, 127 S.W.2d 714 (1939); In re Simard, 98 N.H. 454, 102 A.2d 508 (1954); 6 
PACE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 51.4. 
A draftsman who wishes to make payment a condition subsequent should make 
this explicit, since courts prefer to construe gifts requiring the payment of money by 
the beneficiary as subject to charges rather than conditions. See, e.g., Schrader v. 
Schrader, 158 Iowa 85, 139 N.W. 160 (1912). 
19. See Hom Estate, 351 Pa. 131, 40 A.2d 471 (1945) (vested fee subject to divest-
ment gives devisee right to interim rents). Compare .Estate of Bosse, 246 Wis. 252, 
16 N.W.2d 832 (1944) (options give no right to profits until exercised). 
20. I.e., a fee simple on condition subsequent, or subject to a charge. See 2 POWELL, 
REAL PROPERTY 11 180 (1950). 
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does not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities. 21 Moreover, for tax
purposes the courts appear willing to regard a vested interest subject
to conditions or charges as taken by inheritance, thereby allowing a
stepped-up basis. 22
21. GRAY, RuLm AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 205 (4th ed. 1942).
22. See, e.g., Kalbac v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 251, 254 (8th Cir. 1962): "No doubt,
if [testator] ...had realized the tax consequences to petitioners of granting them
in his will an option to buy at a low price the stock of his Company, he would
instead, have left the stock to them outright, subject perhaps to a lien or charge
in favor of his estate ...." See also Valleskey v. Nelson, 168 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. Wis.
1958), aff'd, 271 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 960 (1960) (implying that
any vested interest would fall within what is now § 1014).
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